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Abstract 
Corruption involves a wide range of activities, which, it is argued, undermine a country’s 
prosperity.  Many scholars suggest that corruption lowers economic growth. Counterarguments, 
however, have been put forth that suggest corruption either fosters growth and development or 
has no significant effect on economic performance. Clearly, there is no consensus in the 
economics literature on the relationship, if any, between corruption and growth.  One of the 
challenges of investigating the impact of corruption on an economy stems from its complex and 
secretive nature that makes it both difficult to define and hard to measure.  In an effort to enter 
the ongoing debate, this study examines the effects of corruption on economic growth in the 
region of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) by using the Transparency International 
Corruption Perceptions Index and employing two panel data on the North African and Gulf 
countries between 2003 and 2013.  These regions are chosen because they are understudies in the 
economic literature and although the World Bank has recently focused on corruption in the 
developing world, very little attention has been paid to the MENA countries. The findings of 
both samples suggest a negative but statistically insignificant relationship between the observed 
countries’ economic growth and the level of corruption.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
Acknowledgments 
First and Foremost, I would like to thank Professor Carol Clark for her continuous guidance and 
inspiration for the past four years. I am grateful to have taken Economics 101 with her and to 
have had her as a mentor during the thesis writing process. Without her, this study would not 
have been possible. I would also like to thank Professor Miguel Ramirez for his assistance and 
feedback in the empirical section of this thesis. He was extremely helpful in offering comments 
and instructions on the econometrics behind the model implemented here .Also, I would like to 
thank Professor Diane Zannoni for her amazing econometrics class which initially got me 
interested in writing a thesis, and for her helpful suggestions. I would like to express my deepest 
gratitude to all the faculty in the Economics Department for attending our presentations and 
offering their feedback. Lastly, I would like to thank my parents and my sister for setting great 
role models and constantly offering advice and support, even from far away.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
Table of Contents 
Abstract……………………………………………………………………………………………2 
Acknowledgments………………………………………………………………………….......…3 
Table of Contents……………………………………………………………………….…………4 
Chapter 1: Introduction ………………………………………………………………………......5 
Brief History of Corruption……………………………………………………………………….5 
Purpose and Outline……………………………………………………………………………….8 
Chapter 2: Literature Review………………………………………………………………….....10 
Definitions and Measurements of Corruption……………………………………………………10 
Previous Theoretical and Empirical Literature………………………………………………..…14 
MENA: Background and Previous Studies……………………………………………………...20 
Chapter 3: Model Specification……………………………………………………………….…23 
Empirical Model…………………………………………………………………………………23 
Data and Variable Description………………………………………………………………..…25 
Chapter 4: Econometric Analysis……………………………………………………………..…29 
Methodology and Preliminary Results………………………………………………………..…29 
Panel Unit Root Tests……………………………………………………………………………34 
Panel Cointegration Analysis………………………………………………………………….…37 
Chapter 5: Conclusion ………………………………………………………………………...…40 
Appendix A. Descriptive Statistics………………………………………………………………42 
Appendix B. Regressions……………………………………………………………………..…44 
Appendix C. Panel Unit Root Tests…………………………………………………………..…48 
Appendix D. Cointegration Test…………………………………………………………………62 
References ………………………………………………………………………………….……65 
 
5 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
Brief History of Corruption 
From embezzlement scandals in the Philippines and money-laundering investigations in 
in Brazil to the recent Panama papers leaks, corruption manages to surface as a worldwide topic 
of interest.  The word itself, corruption,   is derived from the Latin word “corrumpere” which 
means to destroy and spoil. The term was first coined by Greek philosophers who discussed 
corruption within the realm of politics and governmental power. Aristotle explained pure forms 
of government as those “that govern with a view to the common interest” versus corrupt forms 
“that rule with a view to the private interest” (Wallis, 2006, 23). He argued that corruption was a 
phase of decay, almost inevitable in a constitution’s cycle of growth. Polybius related corruption 
to an imbalance in the constitutional structure of the government and further developed 
Aristotle’s two forms of government into six types: kingship, aristocracy and democracy as the 
pure forms, and despotism, oligarchy and mob-rule as the allied forms.  He argued that the 
process through which governments evolve from one form into another is corruption; thus, it is a 
needed force in unmixed governments. The philosopher also mentioned that the prevention of 
corruption includes having a balanced government consisting of its three pure forms to create a 
mixed power (Wallis, 2006, 29).  
Exploring the origins of corruption, we discover that is in fact not a new phenomenon. 
During the second century BCE, the Indian philosopher and royal advisor Kautilya discussed 
corruption in the Hindu treatise “The Arthashastra.” He recognized different ways to embezzle 
government funds in preventing good governance, and argued that corruption cannot be perfectly 
scrutinized (Tanzi, 1998, 4). During the thirteenth century, the Italian poet Dante Aligheri 
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attacked the corruption he observed within the church of Rome in his book the “Inferno.” 
Another example involves Shakespeare’s Hamlet which discusses the corrupt state of Denmark, 
portrayed by a disease. However, and despite the prevalence of this topic throughout history and 
prominent literature, it did not gain international attention until the end of the twentieth century.   
International Institutions, such as the World Bank, initially considered corruption as a 
political problem, which prevented the Group from attempting to address it. As per Article IV, 
section 10, of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development’s (IBRD)1 Articles of 
Agreement, the Bank and its officers “shall not interfere in the political affairs of any member 
(IBRD Articles of Agreement Article IV, 2012).” However, in 1996, the then president of the 
world bank Wolfenshohn   directly acknowledged corruption as a social and economic issue, in 
the Bank’s focus to target economic and financial efficiency “we also need to address 
transparency, accountability, and institutional capacity. And let's not mince words: we need to 
deal with the cancer of corruption” (The World Bank, 1996). This marked the beginning of a 
new paradigm where corruption took place front and center in an international debate regarding 
prevention and elimination of corrupt behavior. Corruption was determined to distribute a 
country’s resources to the higher social classes, at the expense of the poor, as well as divert 
public expenditures and hinder foreign investment. Thus, the recognition of the role of 
corruption as a barrier to an equitable development relates to the World Bank’s two main goals, 
which are to reduce extreme poverty and to promote greater equity in the developing world.  
Since then, the World Bank has contributed to advise and implement over 600 anti-corruption 
programs throughout the world. In Nigeria, the government established the Extractive Industries 
                                                          
1 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development is one of the two institutions constituting 
the World Bank, with the other one being the International Development Association. 
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Transparency Initiative to audit the oil sector which resulted in recovering over $2.4 billion of 
lost revenue. Another example involves the Indian government,  which allocated smartcards in a 
nationwide biometric identification system to lower wrongdoings in welfare programs and 
ensure that the poor receive their needed payments.  Moreover in 1995, Transparency 
International launched its corruption perceptions index which was a significant step in the battle 
against corruption since it allowed to provide data on the topic that was previously more limited. 
Additionally, the United Nations established the United Nations Convention against Corruption 
in 2003 as a legally binding international instrument to mainly enhance transparency as a 
preventive measure as well as criminalize corrupt behaviors as a law enforcement measure.  
Consistent with the Bank’s mission to fight corruption, World Bank Group President Jim 
Yong Kim announced in 2013 that corruption is public enemy number one in developing 
countries. He explained that   “every dollar that a corrupt official or a corrupt business person 
puts in their pocket is a dollar stolen from a pregnant woman who needs health care; or from a 
girl or a boy who deserves an education; or from communities that need water, roads, and 
schools. Every dollar is critical if we are to reach our goals to end extreme poverty by 2030 and 
to boost shared prosperity” (The World Bank, 2013).  
Considering its impact on poverty and foreign investment, corruption became linked 
negatively to economic growth. In fact, a USAID opinion poll survey found that the median 
respondent thinks that “60 percent of aid ends up in the hands of corrupt officials”, while the 
Department for International Development in the United Kingdom found that “57 percent of the 
population reckons that giving aid is pointless because of the level of corruption” (Kenny, 2014). 
And yet, corruption may not be seen as the main problem in the developing world. In a World 
Bank survey, companies are given 15 possible answer choices, ranging from access to finance to 
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regulations, infrastructure, tax rates, crime, and corruption to answer “What’s the most serious 
obstacle facing the operation of this establishment?”, and the surprising finding is that in less 
than 1 percent of countries was “corruption” the most common answer.  Hence, the question is 
whether corruption is indeed a hindering factor to foreign investment and consequently economic 
growth, since it does not seem to be a priority concern for entrepreneurs.  
Purpose and Outline 
This thesis examines the relationship between corruption and economic growth in the 
Middle East and North Africa, in order to determine if corruption is indeed a significant factor in 
reducing growth. The empirical analysis explores the Middle East and North Africa region, 
excluding several countries such as Syria and Iraq due to data limitations. The remaining 
countries are divided into two sub-samples: the Gulf sub sample consisting of seven countries: 
Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Yemen,  and the North 
Africa sub-sample consisting of 6 countries: Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and 
Tunisia. These two regions are respectively based on the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and the 2001 
Arab spring; these two events allowed to group the selected countries into two sub-samples to 
further reduce the differences within the MENA region such as the countries’ various income 
and corruption levels. Furthermore, the study covers the years between 2003 and 2013. It 
includes two panel data as well as unit root tests and cointegration analysis, to test for a stable 
long-run economic structure between the variables in question.  
The following chapters are structured as follows: chapter two offers a review of the 
literature on corruption. It discusses the mechanisms through which corruption can affect 
economic growth, and presents a brief summary of the empirical work to date on the different 
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types of relationship found between the two main variables in question. This chapter also  
presents a brief history of the MENA region as well as the findings of two previous empirical 
studies pertaining to the examined countries and our research question. Chapter three presents 
the conceptual framework and the empirical methodology this study follows. Chapter four 
discusses the econometric analysis implemented to estimate the model, as well as the empirical 
results. The final chapter presents the concluding remarks and discusses the limitations of this 
study.  
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2. Literature Review 
This chapter discusses the extensive economic literature on corruption and growth. Corruption is 
generally perceived as detrimental to economic growth by deterring investment and undermining 
the government’s ability to implement effective policies. However, a significant number of 
studies indicate that corruption actually promotes growth based on its role in increasing public 
officials’ productivity and speeding up bureaucratic delays. Still, others found that there is no 
significant relationship between the two variables. Thus, the economic literature fails to reach a 
consensus on the type of relationship, if any, between corruption and economic growth. The 
contradicting dynamics between the two variables in question could be due to a number of 
differences among the various studies such as the examined regions, independent variables 
specified in the model, data sources, specific time frames and/or the controversies regarding the 
actual definition of corruption and its measurement. This chapter first explores the evolution of 
the definition of corruption as well as the various ways to quantitatively measure its activities. 
Then, it discusses the three theories explaining the types of relationship between corruption and 
economic growth, followed by a discussion of empirical studies supporting these hypotheses. 
Lastly, we take a closer look at the MENA region regarding the history of corruption in the 
region, followed by an analysis of the two previous studies which attempted to answer our same 
research question.  
Definitions and Measurement of Corruption 
Most definitions of corruption tend to be a variation of the more general definition found 
in most articles: the misuse of public office for private gain. This definition fits into the principal-
agent framework where the agents (those who perform tasks) collect benefits at the expense of 
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their principals (those on whose behalf the tasks are performed) (Leruth and Paul, 2006). 
According to the Merriam-Webster dictionary, corruption means “dishonest or illegal behavior 
especially by powerful people, such as government officials or police officers.” The relevant 
literature provides ample definitions of corruption. Edward Van Roy in Theory of Corruption 
(1970) employs the definition of corruption as stated by the Dictionary of Social Sciences as “the 
use of... power for.., .profit, preferment, or prestige, or for the benefit of a group or class, in a 
way that constitutes a breach of law or of standards of high moral conduct” (1964:142). Of the 
earlier definitions, Nye (1967) describes corruption as “behavior which deviates from the formal 
duties of a public role because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) 
pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-
regarding influence.” Waterbury (1973) provides a similar but more succinct definition, as “the 
abuse of public power and influence for private ends.”  
Alam (1989) offers a new insight on the definition of corruption regarding the 
interactions between the agents and the clients. He states that corruption is “(1) the sacrifice of 
the principal’s interest for the agent’s, or (2) the violation of norms defining the agent’s 
behavior.” More recently, Kaufmann and Vicente (2005:3) discuss legal forms of corruption, and 
define it as a “collusive agreement between a part of the agents of the economy who, as a 
consequence, are able to swap (over time; we present a repeated game) in terms of positions of 
power (i.e. are able to capture, together, the allocation process of the economy).” And finally, 
based on what the substantial literature has previously stated, Senior (2006:27) provides a 
condensed definition of corruption. He explains the five simultaneous conditions for corruption 
to occur: “when a corruptor (1) covertly gives (2) a favour to a corruptee or to a nominee to 
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influence (3) action(s) that (4) benefit the corruptor or a nominee, and for which the corruptee 
has (5) authority.”  
Recent anti-corruption initiatives, however, have examined this phenomenon as a 
collective action problem rather than a principal-agent issue. This means that  tackling corruption 
requires significant and comprehensive efforts. This approach considers an individual’s decision 
to engage in corrupt activities depends on other people’s attitudes regarding corruption. If 
corruption is perceived as normal or acceptable in a certain environment, then people will be less 
likely to participate in anti-corruption reforms. If corruption makes everyone better off, then 
people might still get involved in its activities, even if they acknowledge that it is not necessarily 
an ordinary behavior.   
In addition to corruption being difficult to define, another issue is that it is a difficult  
phenomenon to measure due to its secretive and illegal nature. Kaufmann, Krayy and Mastruzzi 
(2006:4) argue that “since corruption is clandestine, it is virtually impossible to come up with 
precise objective measures of it.” Nonetheless, they identify three ways through which 
corruption can be measured: 
 Audits of specific projects can be useful in finding wrongdoings of those in 
charge. This measure is specific to certain projects at a point in time. It does not 
indicate the general level of corruption in a country, and would not be 
appropriate for cross-sectional comparisons across time.  
 Institutional features of a country help explain the incentives and opportunities 
for potential corruption, but do not measure the actual level of corruption. Thus, 
they would not be suitable for a cross-country comparison. 
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 Surveys of firms, public officials, and individuals, as well as views of outside 
observers in NGOs, multilateral donors, and the private sector. These measures 
constitute the most appropriate technique for cross-sectional comparisons when 
employed in panel data. 
One concern may be that surveys are based on people’s perceptions regarding corruption. Since 
corrupt activities are mostly not declared and do not leave a paper trail, and their perceptions of 
those sharing their real experiences are the closest proxy to measuring corruption thus far. Thus, 
perceptions are important in the sense that they impact citizens’ decisions: a citizen who thinks 
that a government official is corrupt might opt out of using his/her services in the future, even if 
his opinion might not be true. Moreover, subjective data gathered through surveys have become 
detailed and quantitative. For example, a question from the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI)2 
administered by the World Economic Forum asks “ To what extent is the judiciary in your 
country independent from influences of members of government, citizens, or firms?.” The 
respondents have to choose a number between 1 and 7, ranging from heavily influenced to 
entirely independent, respectively. Another question states “When firms like yours do business 
with the government, how much of the contract value must they offer in additional payments to 
secure the contract?.” This attempts to value the bribe amounts. However, it is important to note 
that no method can produce exact, precise and complete measurements of corruption. Uncertain 
and inaccurate results occur for two main reasons: i) measurement errors due to the difficulty to 
distinguish between closely related terms in survey questions such as corruption and 
incompetence; that is, a respondent might mean to refer to incompetence,  but interchangeably 
                                                          
2 The Global Competitiveness Index attempts to quantify the impact of a number of key factors which contribute to create the 
conditions for competitiveness, with particular focus on the macroeconomic environment, the quality of the country’s institutions, 
and the state of the country’s technology and supporting infrastructure. 
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uses the word corruption, even though they indicate different phenomenona,  ii) lack of 
correlation between various measures of corruption; that is corruption in a certain governmental 
project may not be indicative of corruption in the public sector in general.                                                                                                                                 
Despite the inevitable margin of error, informed views and opinions of relevant observers 
constitute the most credible and quantitative measure available for otherwise secretive activities.  
Kaufmann et al., (2006, 2) mention that perceptions of corruption “are sometimes the best, and 
the only, information we have.” Survey questions are also the only source that makes cross-
country comparisons in scale of corruption over  a significant period of time, since they form the 
only data that cover a large number of countries for a long time frame.  
Even though measuring corruption faces empirical challenges, there is an extensive literature 
regarding the cause and effect relationships between corruption and economic growth as well as 
many empirical studies examining the dynamic between these variables.  
Previous Theoretical and Empirical Literature 
The Causal Mechanism between Corruption and Economic Growth 
The prevalent theory states that corruption reduces economic growth. An example woulf 
be Shleifer and Vishny (1993). They employ a principal-agent model, where the principal is the 
top level of government and the agent is the corrupt official who accepts bribes from individuals 
who wish to obtain a certain good produced by the principal, such as a passport or an import 
license. The authors present two types of governmental corruption: corruption without theft, 
where the government receives its normal fees and the bureaucrats receive bribes above those 
fees, and corruption with theft, where the bureaucrats receive bribes without giving the 
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government its fees.  In this second type, government officials serve their own self-interests to 
the detriment of serving the interests of the government.  
The authors explain the two main channels through which corruption hurts growth. First, 
a weak governmental system allows the free entry of competing bureaucracies and governmental 
agencies, each imposing independent bribes on private agents, which will increase the total 
bribes burden, prevent a project from moving forward, and dampen future investments and 
growth. Second, the underground nature of corrupt activities distorts the allocation of resources 
and investments in a country; as a consequence, resources shift away from high value projects 
such as education, to lower value projects, such as defense. This is because corruption can occur 
more secretly in the defense sector: educational projects, for example, would require the 
collective participation of societies’ members while defense related projects may take place 
without the knowledge of citizens or their active participation. Thus, the secrecy of corruption 
discourages useful projects and lowers investment and growth. Similarly, Myrdal (1968) argues 
that corruption allows government officials to implement deliberate bureaucratic measures,  such 
as delays to attract more bribes, thus creating bottlenecks to investments which subsequently 
reduces growth.   
However, other scholars claim that corruption is beneficial to growth. Leff (1964, 8) first 
attempted to analyze the relationship between bureaucratic corruption, defined as “an extra-legal 
institution used by individuals or groups to gain influence over the actions of the bureaucracy,” 
and economic development. He argues that corruption reduces uncertainty and hence, increases 
investment. In underdeveloped countries, investors are concerned with the government’s actions, 
the unstable political and economic situation, and the usual risk attached to any investment 
decision. Thus, bureaucratic corruption encourages investment from potential entrepreneurs by 
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offering a certain guarantee against the often changing, arbitrary government policies. Thus, 
investors can better predict the turnout of their endeavors, which will reduce their potential risk 
and uncertainty, and increase investment and economic development.  
Similarly, Huntington (1968) argues that corruption can be beneficial to growth by 
allowing individuals to pay bribes and, thus, bypass the costly bureaucratic administrative system 
in place. Lui (1985) develops an equilibrium queuing model of bribery, where customers are 
ranked based on their respective values of time. He argues that corruption is an efficient 
mechanism which increases the speed of service and allows the arrangement of the waiting line 
so that individuals with higher values of time are able to move to the front of the queue. It 
follows that potential investors have a higher opportunity cost of time than other people waiting 
in line and can afford to pay higher bribes to obtain a certain permit for example; thus, corruption 
assists them in avoiding bureaucratic delays. In this process, such unproductive activities which 
the full utilization of a company’s potential profits can be reduced, thus leading to enhancing 
growth overall.  
Acemoglu and Verdier (1998) examine an economy focused on contracts (a source of 
investment) between private agents, where the state has a crucial role in enforcing these property 
rights and their allocational roles. In this scenario, corruption can cause a public official to 
abandon objective criteria and side unfairly with one of the contract’s parties. In this case, 
property rights won’t be suitably enforced. They create a model consisting of an infinite number 
of agents who are either an entrepreneur or a bureaucrat. Following a series of cases, the authors 
argue that corruption is too costly to prevent altogether and that it is optimal to allow some level 
of corruption and not fully enforce property rights. In fact, the purpose of contract enforcement is 
to redistribute the profits from an investment project based on previously agreed upon pacts. 
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However, this argument assumes that, after the end of the project, there will be incentives to 
“violate these property rights, and the rents for the government employees are necessary in order 
to prevent such violations (corruption)” (Acemoglu and Verdier, 1998, 1395). Thus, rents in one 
public sector increase the cost of property rights enforcement and distort the allocation of talent, 
which leads to the trade-off balance between these variables. A certain level of corruption is thus 
beneficial, in a way which increases investments and enhances the allocation of talent.  
Empirical Studies on the Corruption-Growth Relationship 
The vast majority of empirical studies suggest that corruption is harmful to economic 
growth. Considering the difficulty in measuring corruption, and thus the lack of data, empirical 
studies investigating the effect of this variable are fairly recent. Mauro (1995) was one of the 
pioneers who empirically demonstrated the negative impact of corruption on growth, employing 
a cross sectional panel data consisting of 70 selected countries around the world for the period 
1980 to 1983. He finds that corruption lowers private investment, and thus aggregate growth. 
Moreover, he finds that the bureaucratic efficiency index3 is negatively correlated with 
investment and growth. Bad institutions cause low growth through lowering investment, and vice 
versa: bureaucratic efficiency causes high investment and thus growth. However, Svensson 
(2005) updates Mauro’s work on the same sample of countries and runs the calculations again 
covering the period between 1982 and 2000. He finds that the coefficient on corruption is indeed 
negative but statistically insignificant, concluding that “to the extent we can measure corruption 
                                                          
3 Mauro combined three indices: red tape, corruption and judiciary system into one composite index called 
bureaucratic efficiency. He argued that due to the measurement errors in each individual index, the averaged 
composite index would provide better results regarding investment and growth, than the corruption index alone. A 
high value of the composite index indicates higher corruption; thus, a high index value would lead to lower 
investment.  
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in a cross-country setting, it does not affect growth” (Svensson, 2005, 39). Mo (2001) uses a 
panel data of 46 countries, similar to those used in Mauro’s study, between 1970 and 1985 to 
study the quantitative role of corruption in economic growth. He finds that political instability is 
the main channel through which corruption negatively impacts growth: since corruption distorts 
resources and leads to increased inequality and decreased productivity growth, it creates a 
sociopolitical unstable environment. He also finds that corruption   impacts growth through other 
channels such as the reduction of human capital, and the share of private investment.  
On the other hand, there are empirical studies which report the positive impact of 
corruption on growth. Egger and Winner (2005) employ a panel data of 73 countries between 
1995 and 1999 and find a positive relationship between corruption and foreign direct investment 
(FDI).  The authors argue that corruption can help circumvent bureaucratic delays and thus is a 
stimulus for FDI, from which government officials reap a portion of the profits.   
A third group of scholars finds little empirical impact of corruption on economic growth. 
Abed and Davoodi (2002) consider corruption to be a symptom of weak institutions within 
transitional economies. They examine 25 such countries for the period between 1994 and 1998 to 
test their hypothesis that “structural reforms are statistically and economically more significant in 
explaining economic performance” (Abed and Davoodi, 2002, 15). They argue that the 
explanatory power of corruption, when measured against that of structural reforms, is 
insignificant. The authors regress per capita FDI (in U.S. dollars per capita) against the 
corruption index, the structural reform index and four control variables including the natural 
resource wealth, the initial wage inflation, the initial secondary enrollment rate, and the 
population. First, they estimate the regression only including one of the indices, along with the 
other explanatory variables. Both variables are significant when they are estimated separately. 
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However, when both are included in the model, the corruption index becomes insignificant. This 
finding suggests that “structural reforms are more important than reduced corruption in attracting 
foreign direct investment” (Abed and Davoodi, 2000, 33). Thus, structural reforms4 are 
statistically more significant in explaining the variation in macroeconomic indicators such as 
growth. Similarly, Drury, Kriechkaus and Lustig (2006) employ a panel data of over 100 
countries between 1982 and 1997. They reconceptualize the relationship between corruption                
and growth by introducing democracy into the equation: the corruption variable is interacted 
with a democracy composite index5 to test the role of the latter on economic growth. The 
findings suggest that, while non-democracies tend to suffer from the negative impact                         
of corruption, democratic regimes mitigate the ill effects of corruption on economic                   
growth. A democratic electoral system allows citizens to periodically remove corrupt leaders 
from positions of power, thereby lowering the level of corruption. This mechanism does not 
guarantee that democracies are corruption free; in fact, many democratic regimes still exhibit a 
high level of corruption, but it is not related to growth-impairing activities. First, in democracies, 
as opposed to authoritarian regimes, the press has a significant level of freedom to discuss and 
publish about growth-impairing activities, thus limiting their proliferation. Second, the judiciary 
has greater independence in democracies, which provides more scrutiny to the composition of 
corruption and thus reduces its growth-impairing activities. Third, political institutions in 
                                                          
4 Structural reforms: rationalization of state functions, reliance on market-based pricing, and establishment of a 
sound regulatory environment (Abed and Davoodi, 39) 
5 Democracy index is created by combining 3 indices of democracy: 
-Polity IV data: measures the level of democracy and autocracy in a country and creates an overall score ranging 
from -10 to 10.  
-Freedom House: measures a country’s political and civil liberties and creates an index ranging from 2 to 14 (a 
lower score means more democracy) 
-Alvarez et al. (1996): democracy index which classifies countries as either democratic or not. A country is 
considered democratic if: the chief executive is elected, the legislature is elected, and there is more than one party.  
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democracies tend to restrict politicians’ individual actions and their potential participation in 
growth-impairing corruption.  
 
We find that most literature on the corruption-growth relationship focuses on a large 
selection of countries, or smaller groups which do not include the Middle East and North Africa 
region. Thus, in order to study this relationship, we chose to restrict our analysis to the MENA 
region, in an effort to limit variations between countries in a large selected group, which might 
generate inconsistent estimates. Moreover, the region is understudied as there has only been a 
few empirical analyses regarding this subject. The MENA has recently been attracting 
international attention mainly due to a stagnant economic situation and political events, where 
the fight against corruption was a main factor in the uprising.   
 
MENA: Background and Previous Studies 
Historical Background 
 The modern history of the Middle East begins in the early 16th century, when the 
Ottoman Empire was at its peak, extending east into Persia, south into Mecca, and as far west as 
Vienna. The Empire also controlled Egypt and some parts of North Africa. Over the next three 
centuries, the Ottoman Empire would decline in power, because of its unpopular rule and the 
increased interest of European powers in the region. By 1912, the Ottoman Empire had lost 
control of the Persian Gulf to the British, the French had  gained influence over the Levant, and 
the Italians had seized Libya and the Dodecanese islands. The Ottoman Empire eventually 
collapsed by the end of World War I after being defeated by the British forces and Arab 
populations in the Sinai and Palestine Campaign. The ottoman dynasty became a Turkish 
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Republic and the Middle East was partitioned between the French and the British in the secret 
treaty known as the Sykes-Picot Agreement. Around the same time, the Bbalfour Declaration 
promised the international Zionist movement a Jewish homeland in Palestine.  
During the interwar period, the national boundaries of states under the French or the 
British mandate were established. Many populations in the Middle East and North Africa took 
steps towards independence which was not achieved until the 1940s.  The departure of the 
European powers, as well as the declaration of the state of Israel in 1948, were turning points in 
the history of the Middle East.  
The Discovery of oil in Saudi Arabia, Iran, Libya, Algeria, and other states was also a 
critical moment. Oil revenues in the post WWII period were at the center of many economies in 
the Middle East, and many states experienced tremendous economic growth. In 1979, the Islamic 
Revolution in Iran took place, creating an Islamic republic where a secular monarchy once was.  
The Revolution affected Arab states and lead to a rise in Islamism.  
The most recent turning point occurred in the late 2010s, when the Tunisian Bouazizi set 
himself on fire after getting rejected from several jobs. Unemployment rates were extremely low, 
political corruption was rampant and inflation was on the rise,  which escalated into a contagious  
Arab Spring affecting many North African countries. Protesters demanded democratic reform, 
social justice, and for corruption and cronyism to be curbed.  
 
Previous Studies 
Most of the studies regarding corruption and growth cover regions in the world outside 
MENA. However, and to the best of our knowledge, there are two main studies which offer 
opposing views concerning the impact of corruption on economic growth in the MENA region. 
22 
 
Kutan, Douglas and Judge (2013) find a positive relationship between corruption and economic 
development. They run a panel study on sixteen MENA countries6 between 1993 and 2003, and 
find that that higher levels of corruption are related to higher levels of GDP pc in these countries. 
They argue that corruption plays a beneficial role in many MENA countries, rich in natural 
resources, since it helps to circumvent bureaucratic barriers and delays, thus facilitating 
investment projects and creating an efficient and desirable business setting. On the other hand, 
Hakimi and Hamdi (2015) examine the relationship in question in fifteen MENA countries7. 
They find that corruption does in fact hinder economic growth, through lowering investment 
activities and foreign direct investment inflows. Furthermore, the detrimental effects of 
corruption on economic growth hold up even in the presence of strong governance indicators 
such as political stability and rule of law.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
6 The selection of country is not specified; we only know that Israel is included in the panel.  
7 15 MENA countries: Algeria, Bahrain, Cyprus, Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey and United Arab Emirates 
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3. Model Specification 
 
Empirical Model  
This thesis bases its conceptual framework on the growth model constructed by Solow 
and Swan (1956), where economic growth was examined as a result of capital accumulation and 
technological progress. We utilize the following production function, defined as Hicks-Neutral: 
Q=A f (K, L) 
where Q is output, A is technological progress, and K and L respectively denote capital and 
labor.  
This function portrays technological progress as an increasing scale factor, which will not be a 
point of interest in our study. However, this model is relevant since it confirms the selection of 
two of our independent variables as determinants of economic growth: foreign direct investment 
as a proxy for capital, and the labor force.  
Thus, the empirical model is as follows: 
GDP it = β0+ +β1 FDI it + β2 LABOR it + β3 CPI it + β4 GOV it +  β5 CPI*FDI it + e it 
where GDP (per capita) is a measure of economic growth, FDI is a measure of net inflows of 
foreign direct investment a country receives, LABOR is a measure of the labor force, CPI is a 
measure of corruption, GOV is a measure of government effectiveness, and CPI*GOV is an 
interactive variable combining both corruption and government effectiveness. Also included is 
eit, as the error term.  
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The subscript i and t indicate that this is a panel study, with i representing each cross sectional 
unit, that is each country and t representing each time period, that is each year.  
The Middle East and North Africa region is not restricted to one unique standardized 
definition or selection of countries. The World Bank includes 20 countries in the MENA region: 
Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Israel, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, 
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, West Bank and Gaza, and 
Yemen. The majority of those countries (18 Arabic speaking countries) are included in the Arab 
League, in addition to Mauritania, Somalia and Sudan. Thus, the most comprehensive sample of 
countries within MENA would include 24 countries, including Turkey. For the purposes of this 
study, we restrict our analysis to the MENA region defined by Arab League membership. 
However, due to data limitations, the initial  sample consists of 13 MENA countries: Algeria, 
Bahrain, Egypt, Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, United Arab 
Emirates and Yemen, with a time frame between 2003 and 2013. 
Considering the wide variation in the level of corruption between these countries, and the 
different political events which affected some areas and not others, this sample will be divided 
into2 sub-samples: 
 The gulf region: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and 
Yemen. This grouping consists of all countries in the gulf area, which are rich in natural 
resources such as petroleum, and have suffered a setback in this field after the 2003 
invasion of Iraq, an important source of gas and petroleum in the region.   
 North Africa: Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia. These countries 
participated in the Arab Spring starting in 2011. 
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Each sample will constitute a panel data. This type of econometric modeling allows the grouping 
of many cross-sections over many time periods. As Asteriou and Hall (2011, 416) explain, the 
combined panel data matrix set “consists of a time series for each cross-sectional member in the 
data set and offers a variety of estimation methods.” This analytical method is considered to be 
efficient in modeling data (Asteriou and Hall, 2011, 416). It assumes that all cross-sections share 
a common set of parameters; thus if this assumption holds, the advantages of panel data include: 
i) increasing the sample size which leads to more robust estimates and more information 
regarding the data, ii) avoiding the problem of omitted variables which generate biased estimates 
in other types of modeling such as individual regressions.  
However, panel data must also deal with stationarity and cointegration issues, previously only 
discussed in time-series analysis. Thus, this study will employ panel unit root tests, mainly the 
Levin, Lin, and Chu (LLC) and the Im, Pesaran and Shin (IPS) tests on each of the variables. 
Additionally, to test for a long term relationship between corruption and economic growth, the 
Pedroni methodology as a cointegration test will be performed to examine the relationship in 
question. The following chapter will discuss these tests and their results.  
 
Data and Variable Description 
Dependent Variable: 
Real gross domestic product per capita (constant 2005 US dollars) denoted by GDP is a proxy 
for economic growth. Data is from the World Bank database, which defines GDP as “the sum of 
gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any 
subsidies not included in the value of the products” (World Bank, 2016).  
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Independent Variables: 
i) Corruptions Perceptions Index (CPI), prepared by Transparency International and is a proxy 
for corruption.The index was first launched in 1995 when only 41 countries were covered. By 
2015, 177 countries are covered. It calculates an annual score for each country based on how 
corrupt its public sector is perceived to be. The score ranges from 0, which means the country is 
perceived to be highly corrupt to 10, which means it is perceived to be very clean.                        
CPI is considered to be “a poll of polls”: Transparency International does not create nor perform 
the surveys and assessments in different countries, but rather combines their results from other 
institutions in order to create an aggregate corruption indicator for each country.The surveys are 
carried out by different independent institutions around the world. Each covers a number of 
countries, or a certain region. For a country to be included in the CPI results, it must be included 
in the assessment results of at least three of these institutions. To construct the 2013 CPI results, 
13 total data sources8 were used. For example, the African Development Bank Governance 
Ratings covered all 54 African countries. The analysis is carried out by a group of economists 
and local experts in the examined countries. Their assessment targeted the following dimensions: 
“the accountability of the executive to oversight institutions and of public employees for their 
                                                          
8 The 13 data sources: African Development Bank Governance Ratings 2012, Bertelsmann Foundation Sustainable 
Governance Indicators 2014, Bertelsmann Foundation Transformation Index 2014, Economist Intelligence Unit 
Country Risk Ratings, Freedom House Nations in Transit 2013, Global Insight Country Risk Ratings, IMD World 
Competitiveness Yearbook 2013, Political and Economic Risk Consultancy Asian Intelligence 2013, Political Risk 
Services International Country Risk Guide,  Transparency International Bribe Payers Survey 2011, World Bank - 
Country Policy and Institutional Assessment 2012, World Economic Forum Executive Opinion Survey (EOS) 2013, 
World Justice Project Rule of Law Index 2013 
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performance, access of civil society to information on public affairs, and state capture by narrow 
vested interests” (Transparency International, 2013), based on which an aggregate score is 
created ranging from 1 to 6, where 1 is very weak and 6 is very strong. Other questions are more 
specific such as, “to what extent are public officeholders prevented from abusing their position 
for private interests?” asked by the Bertelsman Foundation which covers all 41 OECD and EU 
countries. Scores range from 1, meaning the highest level of corruption to 10 meaning the 
lowest.  
 
ii) Total labor force: the data is from the World Bank Database and it consists of people who 
are aged 15 years old and older, who meet the economically active population definition 
according to the International Labor Organization, that is, “all people who supply labor for the 
population of goods and services during a specific period. It includes both the employed and 
unemployed.” (World Bank, 2016) 
 
iii) Foreign Direct Investment: the data is from the World Bank Database and is “the net 
inflows of investment to acquire a lasting management interest (10 percent or more of voting 
stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor. It is the sum of 
equity capital, reinvestment earnings, other long-term capital, and short-term capital as shown in 
the balance of payments.” (World Bank, 2016) It is included as a percentage of Gross Domestic 
Product.  
 
iv) Government Effectiveness: the data is from the World Government Indicators and it 
captures “perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the 
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degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies” 
(Kaufmann et al., 2010). The values of the index range between -2.5 and 2.5, with higher values 
associated with better outcomes. This index is constructed by compiling results from various 
institutions, with each one covering a certain area of governance.  For example, the Economic 
Intelligence Unit (EIU) measures the quality of bureaucracy and institutional effectiveness, while 
the World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report (GCS) deals with infrastructure.  
 
 It should be noted that the interactive variable of both corruption and foreign direct 
investment is included to test for the role of corruption in the presence of foreign direct 
investment on economic growth.  All variables, except those in index form, are used in log-linear 
specifications to generate a more normal distribution and avoid violating the normality 
assumption which leads to obtaining more consistent estimates. Additionally, and due to lack of 
data for a few years, we used interpolation to calculate the missing values, by averaging the 
previous and following years: for Mauritania, we averaged the CPI variable for 2003 and 2006 to 
generate the same value for the years of 2004 and 2005, and for Libya, we averaged the FDI 
value for 2010 and 2012 to obtain the 2011 value.  
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4. Econometric Analysis 
 
 
Methodology and Preliminary Results 
 
First, we estimate the following equation using the common constant method, also known as the 
basic pooled regression model. 
LGDP it = β0+β1 LFDI it-1 + β2 LLABOR it + β3 CPI it + β4 GOV it + β5 LFDI it-1*CPI it +D1+ eit 
This estimation assumes that there is one common constant for all cross-sections indicated by β0, 
which suggests that the data is homogenous and there are no differences between the estimated 
cross-sections. One fixed intercept for all countries implies that the same country is repeated 
however many cross-sections there are. However, this case is restrictive and does not apply to 
our sub-samples. Even though the countries in each sub-sample are in geographic proximity and 
share similarities regarding the political and cultural environment, they still exhibit major 
differences such as the size of the economy, or the median income, which does not match the use 
of this method. Thus, we perform the Hausman test to choose between the other two methods 
mostly used in panel data: the Fixed Effects Model (FEM) or the Random Effects Model (REM) 
for each of the sub-samples. This specification test is based on the idea that “under the 
hypothesis of no correlation, both OLS and GLS are consistent, but OLS is inefficient, whereas 
under the alternative, OLS is consistent, but GLS is not” (Asteriou and Hall, 2011, 420). Thus, 
the null hypothesis states that the random effect is appropriate, while the alternative one states 
that the fixed effect is appropriate.  
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North Africa Subsample: 
The random effects model could not be implemented because the number of cross sections does 
not exceed the number of coefficients, thus we default to the fixed effects model. This 
specification is advantageous in that it does not assume that the coefficients are the same for all 
cross-sections, and throughout the time span of the data. It is constant specific,  that is it includes 
different constants for each cross-section, which do not vary over time, hence the “fixed effect”. 
It is portrayed by the following equation, where the intercept β0 includes the subscript i, which 
indicates the country particularity.  
 
LGDP it = β0i+β1 LFDI it-1 + β2 LLABOR it + β3 CPI it + β4 GOV it + β5 LFDI it-1*CPI it +D1+ eit 
FEM is also known as the Least-Squares Dummy Variable model (LSDV) because it provides a 
differential intercept dummy for each cross-section in order to permit each one a different 
constant. The following equation explains this model: 
 
LGDP it = α0 + α1D1i + …+ α6D6i+ β1LFDI it-1 + β2 LLABOR it + β3 CPI it + β4GOV it + 
Β5 LFDI it-1*CPI it + β6D1+ eit 
where D1i = 1 if the observation belongs to Egypt, 0 otherwise; D2i = 1 if the observation belongs 
to Libya, 0 otherwise; and so on. We include 6 dummy variables since we have 7 countries, in 
order to avoid perfect collinearity. Thus, the first country Algeria was used as a benchmark 
(Gujarati, 2011).  
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The regression results as shows in Figure 4.1 below indicate that only two coefficients are 
significant at the 5% level, and in the expected direction. The labor force has a positive 
coefficient since an increase in the economically active population is expected to lead to an 
increase in economic growth. The dummy variable is also significant, and has a negative impact 
on growth, since a turbulent political situation generally leads to a reduction in investment and 
growth. Out main variable of interest, the corruption perceptions index, has a negative sign 
suggesting a higher value of the CPI (associated with less corruption) causes a decrease in 
economic growth; however the coefficient is not statistically significant at the 5% level. This 
result mainly confirms the theory that there is no significant relationship between corruption and 
economic growth.  
Figure 4.1: FEM regression Output with cross-section weights 
 
Dependent Variable: LGDP_?   
Method: Pooled EGLS (Cross-section weights)  
Sample (adjusted): 2004 2013   
Included observations: 10 after adjustments  
Cross-sections included: 6   
Total pool (unbalanced) observations: 58  
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix 
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -7.093367 1.992740 -3.559605 0.0009 
LLABOR_? 0.966009 0.133983 7.209911 0.0000 
LFDI_?(-1) -0.046890 0.059666 -0.785889 0.4360 
CPI_? -0.027655 0.026855 -1.029806 0.3085 
LFDI_?(-1)*CPI_? 0.018652 0.019339 0.964457 0.3399 
GOV_? 0.039575 0.046359 0.853671 0.3977 
D1_? -0.013801 0.009791 -1.409488 0.1654 
Fixed Effects 
(Cross)     
ALGERIA--C -0.392164    
EGYPT--C -2.087691    
LIBYA--C 1.972872    
MAURITANIA--C 0.427129    
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MOROCCO--C -0.828567    
TUNISIA--C 0.742364    
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
      Weighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.990111    Mean dependent var 11.60342 
Adjusted R-squared 0.987746    S.D. dependent var 3.888655 
S.E. of regression 0.098027    Sum squared resid 0.442026 
F-statistic 418.6910    Durbin-Watson stat 1.193797 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      Unweighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.969939    Mean dependent var 7.814564 
Sum squared resid 0.925465    Durbin-Watson stat 1.834092 
 
   
   
Gulf Subsample: 
We follow the same methodology as described above. The equation remains the same, but we 
exclude the dummy variable since the gulf countries did not experience the political event of the 
Arab Spring that the North African countries witnessed. Thus, the equations for this sample is as 
follows:  
LGDP it = β0i+β1 LFDI it-1 + β2 LLABOR it + β3 CPI it + β4 GOV it + β5 LFDI it-1*CPI it + eit 
After conducting the Hausman test, the results barely allows us to fail to reject the null 
hypothesis, with a p-value of 0.0591. Thus, we default to the fixed effects model to estimate the 
regression, considering its advantages as previously discussed.  
Figure 4.2: FEM regression Output with cross-section weights 
 
Dependent Variable: LGDP_?   
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Method: Pooled EGLS (Cross-section weights)  
   
Sample (adjusted): 2004 2013   
Included observations: 10 after adjustments  
Cross-sections included: 7   
Total pool (unbalanced) observations: 61  
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 11.80213 0.588600 20.05119 0.0000 
LLABOR_? -0.144184 0.036240 -3.978582 0.0002 
CPI_? -0.007083 0.022475 -0.315142 0.7540 
GOV_? 0.198478 0.085083 2.332765 0.0238 
LFDI_?(-1) -0.063261 0.038914 -1.625635 0.1104 
CPI_?*LFDI_?(-1) 0.014701 0.007581 1.939114 0.0583 
Fixed Effects 
(Cross)     
BAHRAIN--C -0.204183    
KUWAIT--C 0.637859    
OMAN--C -0.349833    
QATAR--C 1.003619    
SAUDIARABIA--C 0.204213    
UAE--C 0.553182    
YEMEN--C -2.626802    
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
      Weighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.995917    Mean dependent var 14.47565 
Adjusted R-squared 0.995000    S.D. dependent var 9.135991 
S.E. of regression 0.094390    Sum squared resid 0.436568 
F-statistic 1086.490    Durbin-Watson stat 0.616274 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      Unweighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.993097    Mean dependent var 9.744986 
Sum squared resid 0.532719    Durbin-Watson stat 0.376447 
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The regression results above indicate that all coefficients are statistically significant at the 5% 
level, except that of the CPI, which is negative as in the first subsample This result also confirms 
the theory that corruption has an insignificant impact on economic growth. Both CPI                             
and LFDI(-1)  have a negative coefficient, however, the interactive variable indicates that their 
combination generates a positive impact on growth, which could be interpreted that corruption 
enhances the impact of foreign direct investment on economic growth.  
As previously mentioned the FEM acknowledges the individuality of each cross-section and thus 
allows heterogeneity. Nonetheless, the results might still be biased or inconsistent since the 
variables might not be stationary throughout a time period. Macroeconomic variables, such as 
those included in this study, might be trended, that is non-stationary and exhibit unit roots over 
time. Thus, the implementation of a FEM on possibly non-stationary variables would lead to a 
spurious regression. Thus, we will test for panel unit roots and find the order of integration of the 
variables. What follows is a panel cointegration test, if the variables exhibit the same order of 
integration, to determine if there is a long-term relationship among them.  
1. Panel Unit Root Tests 
Applying ordinary or generalized least squares approaches to non-stationary data can produce 
spurious regressions which will lead to incorrect conclusions. High R-squared values, as those in 
Figure 4.1, are a symptom of possible non-stationarity in the data. According to Asteriou and 
Hall (2011, 335), a non-stationary series “has no long-run mean to which the series returns [after 
a shock], and the variance will depend on time and will approach infinity as time goes to 
infinity.” Thus, it is crucial to test for the presence of a unit root,  that is non-stationarity. 
Consider the following time series first autoregressive order AR(1) model,  
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𝑌𝑡 = α 𝑌𝑡−1 + e𝑡,  
where e𝑡 is a white noise process and the stationarity condition is |α| <1. Thus, a unit root is 
present when α=1. In this case, substracting 𝑌𝑡−1 from both sides of the equation gives the 
following:  
𝑌𝑡 − 𝑌𝑡−1 = 𝑌𝑡−1 − 𝑌𝑡−1 + e𝑡 
 ∆𝑌𝑡 = e𝑡 
After differencing Yt,  the series is rendered stationary since e𝑡 is a white noise process. It is 
integrated of order one or I (1) because it became stationary in its first differenced form. Other 
series might need to be integrated d times before they become stationary, hence they are said to 
be integrated of order d.  
Ramirez (2007, 349) mentions that panel unit root tests  “are more powerful than unit root tests 
applied to individual series because the information in the time series is enhanced by that 
contained in the cross-section data.  Moreover, individual unit root tests have complicated 
limiting distributions while panel unit root tests provide statistics with a normal distribution in 
the limit.  This study uses two panel unit root tests. First, the Levin, Lin and Chu (LLC) test, 
proposed in 1992 and published in 2002, extends the Augmented Dicky-Fuller test and develops 
the following model,  
∆𝑌𝑖𝑡 = γYit−1 + ∑ 𝜃𝑖L∆𝑌𝑖𝑡−L + 𝛼𝑚𝑖𝑑𝑚𝑡 + εit, 
 
   where 𝑌𝑖𝑡  indicates the pooled variable, γ equals 𝜌 – 1 and is assumed to be fixed for all cross- 
sections, 𝛼𝑚𝑖𝑑𝑚𝑡 indicate exogenous variables and εit indicates the “error terms assumed to be 
mutually independent disturbances” (Ramirez, 2007). The null hypothesis is that γ equals zero 
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which means that the variable is non-stationary, while the alternative hypothesis is that γ <0 
which means the variable is stationary. The result of this test is uniform for all cross-section units 
and does not consider cases where  a series might be have a unit root for only some cross-
sections. Second, the Im, Pesaran and Shin (IPS) test (1997) allows individual unit root 
processes, that is the coefficient of Yit−1 cross-section specific, as the following equation shows 
by the subscript i: 
 
∆𝑌𝑖𝑡 = γiYit−1 + ∑ 𝜃𝑖L∆𝑌𝑖𝑡−L + 𝛼𝑚𝑖𝑑𝑚𝑡 + εit, 
The null hypothesis is that all series are non-stationary, that is exhibit a unit root, while the 
alternative is that “a fraction of the series in the panel are assumed to be stationary” (Asteriou 
and Hall, 2011, 444).  
 
North Africa Subsample: 
Based on the LLC test, all variables are stationary in level form, that is we reject the null 
hypothesis of no-stationary at the  5% significance level. However, the IPS results offer 
contradicting results since some values are above the 0.05 cut-off  value, which does not allow us 
to reject the null hypothesis. In the case of conflicting results by different tests, we conclude that 
that there is a unit root, that is the variables are not stationary in level form. Thus, we conduct the 
unit-root tests in first difference form. The IPS values become statistically significant at the 5% 
level, and we can conclude that the variables are integrated of order one or I(1).  
 
Gulf Subsample: 
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Similar to the results obtained from the first sample, we reject the null hypothesis of no-
stationary at the  5% significance level and conclude that  all variables are stationary in level 
form based on the LLC test. However, the IPS results indicate that some values are above the 
0.05 cut-off  value, which does not allow us to reject the null hypothesis. We may conclude that 
the variables are not stationary in level form. Thus, we conduct the unit-root tests in first 
difference form. The IPS values become statistically significant at the 5% level, and we can 
conclude that the variables are integrated of order one or I(1).  
 
 
2. Panel Cointegration Analysis 
 
Since the variables were not determined to be stationary, the FEM estimates for both sub-
samples generated spurious results.  Thus, it is crucial to conduct a panel cointegration test to 
determine the presence of an economic relationship between the non-stationary variables, 
because “if the variables do not cointegrate we have problems of spurious regression and 
econometric work becomes almost meaningless” (Asteriou and Hall, 2011, 356). For two non-
stationary variables, cointegration exists when there is a linear combination of both variables that 
is stationary.  We consider the following model: 𝑌𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋 𝑡 + 𝜇𝑡, rewritten as 
𝜇𝑡 = 𝑌𝑡 − 𝛽0 − 𝛽1𝑋 𝑡 
to examine the behavior of the error term. 
In the case that the variables   and 𝑋 𝑡 are stationary, the error term 𝜇𝑡 would also be stationary 
and exhibit a normal distribution. However, in the case that the variables are non-stationary,   is  
presented as a combination of two cumulated error processes, also known as stochastic trends. It 
is most likely to also be non-stationary, expected to “wander around and eventually become 
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large” (Asteriou and Hall, 2011, 341) which violates one of the classical assumptions that the 
error term has a well-behaved distribution.   
A special scenario which could result from the second case is when 𝑌𝑡 and 𝑋   are actually 
related; thus, they move together and produce a combination that eliminates the non-stationarity, 
due to the two stochastic trends being similar. Thus, even though the variables are trended, there 
is a common trend which links them together which indicates a genuine long-run relationship 
and cointegration.  
To test for cointegration in panel data, we use the Pedroni methodology which follows the model 
below: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 +∑𝑀𝑚=1  + 𝛽𝑚𝑖𝑋𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡. 
This method allows for multiple regressors, indicated by the values of m, starting at 1 and up to 
M, as well as for both heterogeneity in the errors and the cointegration vector to vary across the 
cross-sectional units. The test includes seven cointegration statistics divided into two categories. 
The first category consists of four panel statistics based on pooling the “within” dimension, that 
is “pooling the AR coefficients across different sections of the panel for the unit-root on the 
residuals”. The second one consists of three group statistics based on pooling the “between” 
dimension, that is “averaging the AR coefficients for each member of the panel for the unit-root 
test on the residuals” (Asteriou and Hall, 2011, 451). The null hypothesis is that there is no 
cointegration, while the alternative is that cointegration is present in the model.  If cointegration 
was found through the panel statistics, then the examined variables are cointegrated for all cross-
sections, and if cointegration was found through the group statistics, then the variables are 
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cointegrated for at least one cross-section. The results of both samples are summarized in the 
below figure 4.2.  
For the North Africa subsample, both panel PP and ADF statistics, as well as the group PP 
statistic allow us to reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration at the 5% significance level. 
We may conclude that there is a long-run equilibrium relationship between the variables in this 
panel. 
For the Gulf Subsample, both panel and group PP and ADF statistics, lead us to reject the null 
hypothesis of no cointegration at the 5% significance level. We may conclude that there is a 
long-run equilibrium relationship between the variables in this panel. 
 
Figure 4.2: Summary of Pedroni  Cointegration Test Results                                                      
 North Africa Subsample Gulf Subsample 
Panel Group Panel Group 
v-statistic -1.669569   13.75239  
rho-statistic  2.120684  3.180448  2.343995  3.549039 
PP-statistic -18.85271* -8.626157* -11.09256* -10.58249* 
ADF-statistic -3.695940*  2.969242 -6.047468* -5.997332* 
 
*Statistically Significant at the 5% level 
 
 
FMOLS Results 
 
 We re-estimate the following equation for each panel and obtain contradicting results for 
each region. Thus, the impact of corruption depends on the area. For the Gulf sample, corruption 
seems to enhance economic growth, possibly due to the country’s dependence on its natural 
resources. Thus, corruption is a tool to oil the bureaucratic wheel and encourage investments. On 
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the other hand, corruption seems to harm economic growth in the North-Africa sample, possibly 
due to institutional factors, beyond the scope of this thesis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
This thesis has explored and empirically estimated the impact of corruption on economic 
growth in two samples in the Middle East and North Africa during the years of 2003 to 2013. 
Both samples of North Africa and the Gulf were grouped based on political events, respectively 
the Arab spring and the invasion of Iraq, which impacted each set of countries differently. 
Moreover, the variation in corruption levels within MENA suggests that the region is best 
analyzed in subsamples to control for such a difference. Using the fixed effects least-squares 
dummy variable model (FEM), both estimated regressions indicated that the coefficient of the 
corruption variable (CPI) has a negative but statistically insignificant relationship with economic 
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growth, proxied by real per capita gross domestic product. This finding confirms the group of 
scholars who argue that corruption does not have a significant impact on growth, and disputes 
the majoritarian theory that corruption hinders economic growth mainly through foreign 
investment.   
However, FEM estimates, if applied to non-stationary data, can generate spurious 
regressions as well as biased and inconsistent results. Thus, we tested for the presence of unit 
roots in each series by employing two panel unit root tests. Both the Levin, Lin and Chu (LLC) 
and the Im, Pesaran and Shin (IPS) tests indicated that the variables were integrated of order one. 
After we found stationarity in the first difference form, we tested for panel cointegration to 
determine if there exists a long-run relationship between the variables in question, which 
validates applying FEM to non-stationary variables. The Pedroni cointegration test, through ADF 
and PP statistics found evidence in both samples that there is panel cointegration in the model. 
However, applying OLS estimates are biased when applied to cointegrated panels; hence, the 
next step will include a regression using the Fully Modified Ordinary Least Squares (FMOLS). 
This method “not only generates consistent estimates of the β parameters in relatively small 
samples, but it controls for the likely endogeneity of the regressors and serial correlation” 
(Ramirez, 2007, 352).  
This thesis has several limitations. First, the relatively short time frame might undermine 
the robustness of the results; this issue is related to the lack of data for many MENA countries, 
especially regarding the Corruption Perceptions Index, which despite its launch in 1995, did not 
cover many of the region’s countries until 2003. Another potential issue is the reliance on 
interpolating data to generate missing values, which weakens the credibility of the data used in 
the empirical model. Evidently, the main issue remains with the inaccurate and imperfect 
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measurement of corruption. In fact, critics of the Corruption Perceptions Index argue that the 
reliance on the opinions of small group of experts and businesspeople “embeds a powerful and 
misleading elite bias in popular perceptions of corruption” (The Guardian, 2013).  
This thesis attempted to offer a contribution to the two previous studies regarding the 
relationship between corruption and growth in the MENA region. And while one study found a 
positive impact of corruption on growth, the other found the opposite relationship. Our study 
now presents a third hypothesis, that corruption does not have a significant impact on economic 
growth in a selection of MENA countries. This finding allows us to question whether corruption 
should be the focus of World Bank initiatives, and whether resources would be optimally utilized 
in other programs to enhance economic growth.  
  
 
 
Appendix A. Descriptive Statistics 
 
North Africa Subsample: 
 
 LGDP_? LLABOR_? LFDI_? CPI_? 
LFDI_?(-
1)*CPI_? GOV_? D1_? 
 Mean  7.844902  15.53078  1.127016  3.191071  3.298717 -0.453519  0.089286 
 Median  8.041059  15.65153  1.026293  3.100000  3.337963 -0.452205  0.000000 
 Maximum  9.121849  17.18189  3.618136  5.000000  11.21622  0.577048  1.000000 
 Minimum  6.483211  13.73344 -0.308838  1.500000 -4.002430 -1.489980  0.000000 
 Std. Dev.  0.727080  1.044570  0.899261  0.706664  2.977101  0.511210  0.287736 
 Skewness -0.070939 -0.144161  0.849489  0.485927  0.403020 -0.008506  2.880632 
 Kurtosis  2.352677  1.809670  3.392417  3.339187  3.310124  2.435197  9.298039 
        
 Jarque-
Bera  1.024698  3.500035  7.094545  2.472281  1.740377  0.745015  170.0007 
 Probability  0.599087  0.173771  0.028803  0.290503  0.418873  0.689005  0.000000 
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 Sum  439.3145  869.7237  63.11290  178.7000  184.7282 -25.39707  5.000000 
 Sum Sq. 
Dev.  29.07546  60.01193  44.47690  27.46554  487.4722  14.37348  4.553571 
        
 Observatio
ns 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 
 Cross 
sections 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
 
Gulf Subsample: 
 
 LGDP_? LLABOR_? CPI_? GOV_? LFDI_?(-1) 
LFDI_?(-
1)*CPI_? 
 Mean  9.744986  14.51610  5.078689  0.297017  0.835041  4.467880 
 Median  9.794511  14.25436  5.100000  0.407091  1.230419  5.375577 
 Maximum  11.03712  16.27944  7.700000  1.167206  2.756879  16.30225 
 Minimum  6.551587  12.85429  2.100000 -1.130834 -3.219854 -15.13331 
 Std. Dev.  1.134146  1.021219  1.319737  0.556357  1.265402  6.726659 
 Skewness -1.722556  0.243140 -0.527774 -0.886596 -1.336709 -1.082128 
 Kurtosis  5.568239  1.744583  2.950544  3.574101  4.319055  3.920712 
       
 Jarque-Bera  46.93098  4.606869  2.838094  8.829242  22.58796  14.05978 
 Probability  0.000000  0.099915  0.241945  0.012099  0.000012  0.000885 
       
 Sum  594.4441  885.4820  309.8000  18.11802  50.93752  272.5407 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  77.17717  62.57332  104.5023  18.57197  96.07455  2714.876 
       
 Observations 61 61 61 61 61 61 
 Cross 
sections 7 7 7 7 7 7 
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Appendix B. Regressions 
 
North Africa Subsample: 
 
 
Dependent Variable: LGDP_?   
Method: Pooled EGLS (Cross-section weights)  
Sample (adjusted): 2004 2013   
Included observations: 10 after adjustments  
Cross-sections included: 6   
Total pool (unbalanced) observations: 58  
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix 
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -7.093367 1.992740 -3.559605 0.0009 
LLABOR_? 0.966009 0.133983 7.209911 0.0000 
LFDI_?(-1) -0.046890 0.059666 -0.785889 0.4360 
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CPI_? -0.027655 0.026855 -1.029806 0.3085 
LFDI_?(-1)*CPI_? 0.018652 0.019339 0.964457 0.3399 
GOV_? 0.039575 0.046359 0.853671 0.3977 
D1_? -0.013801 0.009791 -1.409488 0.1654 
Fixed Effects 
(Cross)     
ALGERIA--C -0.392164    
EGYPT--C -2.087691    
LIBYA--C 1.972872    
MAURITANIA--C 0.427129    
MOROCCO--C -0.828567    
TUNISIA--C 0.742364    
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
      Weighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.990111    Mean dependent var 11.60342 
Adjusted R-squared 0.987746    S.D. dependent var 3.888655 
S.E. of regression 0.098027    Sum squared resid 0.442026 
F-statistic 418.6910    Durbin-Watson stat 1.193797 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      Unweighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.969939    Mean dependent var 7.814564 
Sum squared resid 0.925465    Durbin-Watson stat 1.834092 
 
 
Gulf Subsample: 
 
Dependent Variable: LGDP_?   
Method: Pooled EGLS (Cross-section weights)  
   
Sample (adjusted): 2004 2013   
Included observations: 10 after adjustments  
Cross-sections included: 7   
Total pool (unbalanced) observations: 61  
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 11.80213 0.588600 20.05119 0.0000 
LLABOR_? -0.144184 0.036240 -3.978582 0.0002 
CPI_? -0.007083 0.022475 -0.315142 0.7540 
GOV_? 0.198478 0.085083 2.332765 0.0238 
46 
 
LFDI_?(-1) -0.063261 0.038914 -1.625635 0.1104 
CPI_?*LFDI_?(-1) 0.014701 0.007581 1.939114 0.0583 
Fixed Effects 
(Cross)     
BAHRAIN--C -0.204183    
KUWAIT--C 0.637859    
OMAN--C -0.349833    
QATAR--C 1.003619    
SAUDIARABIA--C 0.204213    
UAE--C 0.553182    
YEMEN--C -2.626802    
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
      Weighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.995917    Mean dependent var 14.47565 
Adjusted R-squared 0.995000    S.D. dependent var 9.135991 
S.E. of regression 0.094390    Sum squared resid 0.436568 
F-statistic 1086.490    Durbin-Watson stat 0.616274 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      Unweighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.993097    Mean dependent var 9.744986 
Sum squared resid 0.532719    Durbin-Watson stat 0.376447 
     
      
 
Appendix C. Hausman Test 
 
Gulf Subsample: 
 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Pool: COUN    
Test cross-section random effects  
     
     
Test Summary 
Chi-Sq. 
Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     Cross-section random 3.681560 5 0.05961 
     
          
Cross-section random effects test comparisons: 
     
Variable Fixed   Random  Var(Diff.)  Prob.  
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     LLABOR_? -0.219688 -0.228220 0.000056 0.2551 
CPI_? -0.000309 -0.000818 0.000000 0.4427 
GOV_? 0.173979 0.203980 0.000348 0.1077 
LFDI_?(-1) -0.060285 -0.061875 0.000002 0.2036 
(CPI_?*LFDI_?(-1)) 0.012602 0.013108 0.000000 0.1284 
     
          
Cross-section random effects test equation:  
Dependent Variable: LGDP_?   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
   
Sample (adjusted): 2004 2013   
Included observations: 10 after adjustments  
Cross-sections included: 7   
Total pool (unbalanced) observations: 61  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 12.87793 0.793575 16.22774 0.0000 
LLABOR_? -0.219688 0.053765 -4.086113 0.0002 
CPI_? -0.000309 0.036069 -0.008578 0.9932 
GOV_? 0.173979 0.138141 1.259433 0.2138 
LFDI_?(-1) -0.060285 0.052652 -1.144970 0.2578 
CPI_?*LFDI_?(-1) 0.012602 0.010021 1.257583 0.2145 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.993471    Mean dependent var 9.744986 
Adjusted R-squared 0.992006    S.D. dependent var 1.134146 
S.E. of regression 0.101405    Akaike info criterion -1.564999 
Sum squared resid 0.503866    Schwarz criterion -1.149745 
Log likelihood 59.73246    Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.402257 
F-statistic 677.8480    Durbin-Watson stat 0.384786 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Appendix D. Panel Unit Root Tests 
 
North Africa Subsample: 
 
Pool unit root test: Summary   
Series: LGDP_ALGERIA, LGDP_EGYPT, LGDP_LIBYA, 
LGDP_MAURITANIA 
        , LGDP_MOROCCO, LGDP_TUNISIA  
  
Sample: 2003 2013   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects 
Automatic selection of maximum lags  
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 to 1 
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
     
        Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -4.41811  0.0000  6  58 
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Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-
stat  -2.14482  0.0160  6  58 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  23.4913  0.0238  6  58 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  30.2673  0.0025  6  60 
     
     ** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic 
Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic 
normality. 
 
 
 
Pool unit root test: Summary   
Series: LGDP_ALGERIA, LGDP_EGYPT, LGDP_LIBYA, 
LGDP_MAURITANIA 
        , LGDP_MOROCCO, LGDP_TUNISIA  
  
Sample: 2003 2013   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects 
Automatic selection of maximum lags  
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
Balanced observations for each test   
     
        Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -6.03657  0.0000  6  54 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-
stat  -3.62894  0.0001  6  54 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  36.5728  0.0003  6  54 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  49.0702  0.0000  6  54 
     
     ** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic 
Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic 
normality. 
 
 
Pool unit root test: Summary   
Series: LLABOR_ALGERIA, LLABOR_EGYPT, 
LLABOR_LIBYA, 
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        LLABOR_MAURITANIA, LLABOR_MOROCCO, 
LLABOR_TUNISIA 
  
Sample: 2003 2013   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects 
Automatic selection of maximum lags  
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 to 1 
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
     
        Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -2.11920  0.0170  6  56 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-
stat   0.68176  0.7523  6  56 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  7.43509  0.8276  6  56 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  23.3958  0.0245  6  60 
     
     ** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic 
Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic 
normality. 
 
 
Pool unit root test: Summary   
Series: LLABOR_ALGERIA, LLABOR_EGYPT, 
LLABOR_LIBYA, 
        LLABOR_MAURITANIA, LLABOR_MOROCCO, 
LLABOR_TUNISIA 
  
Sample: 2003 2013   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects 
Automatic selection of maximum lags  
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 to 1 
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
     
        Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -1.52664  0.0634  6  53 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-
stat  -2.49763  0.0063  6  53 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  30.7727  0.0021  6  53 
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PP - Fisher Chi-square  28.7530  0.0043  6  54 
     
     ** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic 
Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic 
normality. 
 
 
 
Pool unit root test: Summary   
Series: LFDI_ALGERIA, LFDI_EGYPT, LFDI_LIBYA, 
LFDI_MAURITANIA, 
        LFDI_MOROCCO, LFDI_TUNISIA  
  
Sample: 2003 2013   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects 
Automatic selection of maximum lags  
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 to 1 
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
     
        Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -6.24232  0.0000  6  48 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-
stat  -2.72005  0.0033  6  48 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  28.3573  0.0049  6  48 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  23.3063  0.0252  6  50 
     
     ** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic 
Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic 
normality. 
 
 
 
Pool unit root test: Summary   
Series: LFDI_ALGERIA, LFDI_EGYPT, LFDI_LIBYA, 
LFDI_MAURITANIA, 
        LFDI_MOROCCO, LFDI_TUNISIA  
  
Sample: 2003 2013   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects 
Automatic selection of maximum lags  
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 
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Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
     
        Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -4.41426  0.0000  6  48 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-
stat  -2.90444  0.0018  6  48 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  33.0145  0.0010  6  48 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  33.4418  0.0008  6  48 
     
     ** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic 
Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic 
normality. 
 
 
Pool unit root test: Summary   
Series: CPI_ALGERIA, CPI_EGYPT, CPI_LIBYA, 
CPI_MAURITANIA, 
        CPI_MOROCCO, CPI_TUNISIA  
  
Sample: 2003 2013   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects 
Automatic selection of maximum lags  
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
Balanced observations for each test   
     
        Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -2.55079  0.0054  6  60 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-
stat  -0.45081  0.3261  6  60 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  16.0518  0.1889  6  60 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  15.4435  0.2181  6  60 
     
      
 
Pool unit root test: Summary   
Series: CPI_ALGERIA, CPI_EGYPT, CPI_LIBYA, 
CPI_MAURITANIA, 
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        CPI_MOROCCO, CPI_TUNISIA  
  
Sample: 2003 2013   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects 
Automatic selection of maximum lags  
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
Balanced observations for each test   
     
        Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -8.15274  0.0000  6  54 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-
stat  -4.48968  0.0000  6  54 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  42.6625  0.0000  6  54 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  49.8232  0.0000  6  54 
     
     ** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic 
Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic 
normality. 
 
 
 
Pool unit root test: Summary   
Series: GOV_ALGERIA, GOV_EGYPT, GOV_LIBYA, 
GOV_MAURITANIA, 
        GOV_MOROCCO, GOV_TUNISIA  
  
Sample: 2003 2013   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects 
Automatic selection of maximum lags  
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 to 1 
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
     
        Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -1.76605  0.0387  6  57 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-
stat  -0.26604  0.3951  6  57 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  13.9954  0.3010  6  57 
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PP - Fisher Chi-square  20.4884  0.0584  6  60 
     
     ** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic 
Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic 
normality. 
 
 
Pool unit root test: Summary   
Series: GOV_ALGERIA, GOV_EGYPT, GOV_LIBYA, 
GOV_MAURITANIA, 
        GOV_MOROCCO, GOV_TUNISIA  
  
Sample: 2003 2013   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects 
Automatic selection of maximum lags  
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 to 1 
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
     
        Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -5.48075  0.0000  6  52 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-
stat  -2.63752  0.0042  6  52 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  29.2036  0.0037  6  52 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  45.1535  0.0000  6  54 
     
     ** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic 
Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic 
normality. 
 
 
 
Pool unit root test: Summary   
Series: LFDI_ALGERIA(-1)*CPI_ALGERIA, LFDI_EGYPT(-
1)*CPI_EGYPT, 
        LFDI_LIBYA(-1)*CPI_LIBYA, LFDI_MAURITANIA(-
1)*CPI_MAURITANIA, 
        LFDI_MOROCCO(-1)*CPI_MOROCCO, 
LFDI_TUNISIA(-1) 
        *CPI_TUNISIA   
  
Sample: 2003 2013   
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Exogenous variables: Individual effects 
Automatic selection of maximum lags  
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 to 1 
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
     
        Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -2.19496  0.0141  6  48 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-
stat  -1.58245  0.0568  6  48 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  20.9871  0.0506  6  48 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  22.3305  0.0340  6  50 
     
     ** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic 
Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic 
normality. 
 
 
Pool unit root test: Summary   
Series: LFDI_ALGERIA(-1)*CPI_ALGERIA, LFDI_EGYPT(-
1)*CPI_EGYPT, 
        LFDI_LIBYA(-1)*CPI_LIBYA, LFDI_MAURITANIA(-
1)*CPI_MAURITANIA, 
        LFDI_MOROCCO(-1)*CPI_MOROCCO, LFDI_TUNISIA(-
1) 
        *CPI_TUNISIA   
  
Sample: 2003 2013   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects 
Automatic selection of maximum lags  
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
     
        Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -3.78273  0.0001  6  43 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-
stat  -1.75228  0.0399  6  43 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  23.9269  0.0208  6  43 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  26.4538  0.0093  6  43 
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     ** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic 
Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic 
normality. 
 
 
Gulf Subsample: 
 
 
Pool unit root test: Summary   
Series: LGDP_BAHRAIN, LGDP_KUWAIT, LGDP_OMAN, 
LGDP_QATAR, 
        LGDP_SAUDIARABIA, LGDP_UAE, LGDP_YEMEN 
  
Sample: 2003 2013   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects 
Automatic selection of maximum lags  
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 to 1 
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
     
        Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -2.44961  0.0072  7  65 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-
stat   0.23551  0.5931  7  65 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  11.3064  0.6618  7  65 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  16.8578  0.2638  7  70 
     
     ** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic 
Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic 
normality. 
 
 
Pool unit root test: Summary   
Series: LGDP_BAHRAIN, LGDP_KUWAIT, LGDP_OMAN, 
LGDP_QATAR, 
        LGDP_SAUDIARABIA, LGDP_UAE, LGDP_YEMEN 
  
Sample: 2003 2013   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects 
Automatic selection of maximum lags  
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 to 1 
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Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
     
        Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -8.71679  0.0000  7  62 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-
stat  -4.39728  0.0000  7  62 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  46.7043  0.0000  7  62 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  54.0617  0.0000  7  63 
     
     ** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic 
Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic 
normality. 
 
 
Pool unit root test: Summary   
Series: CPI_BAHRAIN, CPI_KUWAIT, CPI_OMAN, 
CPI_QATAR, 
        CPI_SAUDIARABIA, CPI_UAE, CPI_YEMEN 
  
Sample: 2003 2013   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects 
Automatic selection of maximum lags  
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 to 1 
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
     
        Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -1.84137  0.0328  7  68 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-
stat   0.42509  0.6646  7  68 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  9.57175  0.7928  7  68 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  10.6422  0.7139  7  70 
     
     ** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic 
Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic 
normality. 
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Pool unit root test: Summary   
Series: CPI_BAHRAIN, CPI_KUWAIT, CPI_OMAN, 
CPI_QATAR, 
        CPI_SAUDIARABIA, CPI_UAE, CPI_YEMEN 
  
Sample: 2003 2013   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects 
Automatic selection of maximum lags  
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 to 1 
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
     
        Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -6.68288  0.0000  7  61 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-
stat  -4.41795  0.0000  7  61 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  47.4929  0.0000  7  61 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  78.8012  0.0000  7  63 
     
     ** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic 
Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic 
normality. 
 
 
Pool unit root test: Summary   
Series: LFDI_BAHRAIN, LFDI_KUWAIT, LFDI_OMAN, 
LFDI_QATAR, 
        LFDI_SAUDIARABIA, LFDI_UAE, LFDI_YEMEN 
Date: 04/07/16   Time: 06:13  
Sample: 2003 2013   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects 
Automatic selection of maximum lags  
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 to 1 
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
     
        Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -2.98328  0.0014  7  49 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-
stat  -0.98781  0.1616  7  49 
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ADF - Fisher Chi-square  20.1806  0.1245  7  49 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  20.4444  0.1167  7  51 
     
     ** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic 
Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic 
normality. 
 
 
Pool unit root test: Summary   
Series: LFDI_BAHRAIN, LFDI_KUWAIT, LFDI_OMAN, 
LFDI_QATAR, 
        LFDI_SAUDIARABIA, LFDI_UAE, LFDI_YEMEN 
  
Sample: 2003 2013   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects 
Automatic selection of maximum lags  
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 to 1 
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
     
        Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -8.61503  0.0000  7  42 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-
stat  -4.18991  0.0000  6  39 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  38.7690  0.0004  7  42 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  31.7460  0.0044  7  43 
     
     ** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic 
Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic 
normality. 
 
 
 
Pool unit root test: Summary   
Series: GOV_BAHRAIN, GOV_KUWAIT, GOV_OMAN, 
GOV_QATAR, 
        GOV_SAUDIARABIA, GOV_UAE, GOV_YEMEN 
  
Sample: 2003 2013   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects 
Automatic selection of maximum lags  
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 to 1 
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Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
     
        Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -1.79453  0.0364  7  67 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-
stat   0.02230  0.5089  7  67 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  11.5841  0.6397  7  67 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  8.72334  0.8484  7  70 
     
     ** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic 
Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic 
normality. 
 
 
Pool unit root test: Summary   
Series: GOV_BAHRAIN, GOV_KUWAIT, GOV_OMAN, 
GOV_QATAR, 
        GOV_SAUDIARABIA, GOV_UAE, GOV_YEMEN 
  
Sample: 2003 2013   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects 
Automatic selection of maximum lags  
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 to 1 
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
     
        Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -11.3485  0.0000  7  61 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-
stat  -5.88781  0.0000  7  61 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  59.8349  0.0000  7  61 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  72.2250  0.0000  7  63 
     
     ** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic 
Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic 
normality. 
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Pool unit root test: Summary   
Series: LFDI_BAHRAIN(-1)*CPI_BAHRAIN, 
LFDI_KUWAIT(-1) 
        *CPI_KUWAIT, LFDI_OMAN(-1)*CPI_OMAN, 
LFDI_QATAR(-1) 
        *CPI_QATAR, LFDI_SAUDIARABIA(-
1)*CPI_SAUDIARABIA, LFDI_UAE( 
        -1)*CPI_UAE, LFDI_YEMEN(-1)*CPI_YEMEN 
  
Sample: 2003 2013   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects 
Automatic selection of maximum lags  
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 to 1 
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
     
        Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -3.08507  0.0010  7  49 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-
stat  -0.55805  0.2884  7  49 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  16.2991  0.2955  7  49 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  14.7268  0.3971  7  51 
     
     ** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic 
Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic 
normality. 
 
 
Pool unit root test: Summary   
Series: LFDI_BAHRAIN(-1)*CPI_BAHRAIN, 
LFDI_KUWAIT(-1) 
        *CPI_KUWAIT, LFDI_OMAN(-1)*CPI_OMAN, 
LFDI_QATAR(-1) 
        *CPI_QATAR, LFDI_SAUDIARABIA(-
1)*CPI_SAUDIARABIA, LFDI_UAE( 
        -1)*CPI_UAE, LFDI_YEMEN(-1)*CPI_YEMEN 
  
Sample: 2003 2013   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects 
Automatic selection of maximum lags  
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 to 1 
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
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   Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -8.69485  0.0000  7  42 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-
stat  -4.70643  0.0000  6  39 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  41.9200  0.0001  7  42 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  40.1969  0.0002  7  43 
     
     ** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic 
Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic 
normality. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix E. Cointegration Tests 
 
North Africa Subsample: 
 
 
Pedroni Residual Cointegration Test   
Series: LGDP_? LLABOR_? LFDI_? CPI_? LFDI_?(-1)*CPI_? 
GOV_?  
   
Sample: 2003 2013    
Included observations: 11   
Cross-sections included: 6   
Null Hypothesis: No cointegration   
Trend assumption: No deterministic trend  
User-specified lag length: 1   
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
      
      Alternative hypothesis: common AR coefs. (within-dimension) 
    Weighted  
63 
 
  Statistic Prob. Statistic Prob. 
Panel v-Statistic -1.669569  0.9525 -3.531631  0.9998 
Panel rho-Statistic  2.120684  0.9830  2.250359  0.9878 
Panel PP-Statistic -18.85271  0.0000 -12.00899  0.0000 
Panel ADF-Statistic -3.695940  0.0001 -2.396103  0.0083 
      
Alternative hypothesis: individual AR coefs. (between-
dimension) 
      
  Statistic Prob.   
Group rho-Statistic  3.180448  0.9993   
Group PP-Statistic -8.626157  0.0000   
Group ADF-Statistic  2.969242  0.9985   
      
            
Cross section specific results   
      
      Phillips-Peron results (non-parametric)  
      
Cross ID AR(1) Variance HAC   Bandwidth Obs 
ALGERIA -0.594 1.90E-05 2.55E-05 1.00 9 
EGYPT -0.724 1.43E-05 3.39E-06 5.00 6 
LIBYA -0.520 0.038115 0.005303 7.00 9 
MAURITANI
A -0.508 0.000104 0.000122 1.00 6 
MOROCCO 0.364 0.000453 0.000453 0.00 9 
TUNISIA -0.339 9.89E-05 9.89E-05 0.00 9 
      
Augmented Dickey-Fuller results (parametric)  
      
Cross ID AR(1) Variance Lag Max lag Obs 
ALGERIA -0.073 1.44E-05 1 -- 8 
EGYPT -2.444 8.05E-06 1 -- 5 
LIBYA -1.637 0.026797 1 -- 8 
MAURITANI
A 1.438 0.000105 1 -- 4 
MOROCCO 0.017 0.000378 1 -- 8 
TUNISIA -0.089 0.000107 1 -- 8 
      
       
 
 
 
Gulf Subsample: 
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Pedroni Residual Cointegration Test   
Series: LGDP_? LLABOR_? CPI_? LFDI_?(-1) 
GOV_?   
Date: 04/07/16   Time: 06:22   
Sample: 2003 2013    
Included observations: 11   
Cross-sections included: 7   
Null Hypothesis: No cointegration   
Trend assumption: Deterministic intercept and trend  
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC with lags from -1 to 
0 
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
      
      Alternative hypothesis: common AR coefs. (within-dimension) 
    Weighted  
  Statistic Prob. Statistic Prob. 
Panel v-Statistic  13.75239  0.0000 -4.795514  1.0000 
Panel rho-Statistic  2.343995  0.9905  3.325080  0.9996 
Panel PP-Statistic -11.09256  0.0000  0.057226  0.5228 
Panel ADF-Statistic -6.047468  0.0000  0.216203  0.5856 
      
Alternative hypothesis: individual AR coefs. (between-
dimension) 
      
  Statistic Prob.   
Group rho-Statistic  3.549039  0.9998   
Group PP-Statistic -10.58249  0.0000   
Group ADF-Statistic -5.997332  0.0000   
      
            
Cross section specific results   
      
      Phillips-Peron results (non-parametric)  
      
Cross ID AR(1) Variance HAC   Bandwidth Obs 
BAHRAIN -0.601 4.52E-05 3.74E-05 2.00 9 
KUWAIT -0.324 2.26E-05 1.53E-05 5.00 6 
OMAN -0.500 4.64E-05 7.66E-06 6.00 9 
QATAR -0.272 4.47E-05 4.11E-05 1.00 7 
SAUDIARA
BIA -0.779 2.58E-06 2.47E-06 2.00 7 
UAE -0.527 0.000203 4.46E-05 5.00 9 
YEMEN -0.552 1.15E-20 9.24E-21 1.00 4 
      
Augmented Dickey-Fuller results (parametric)  
      
Cross ID AR(1) Variance Lag Max lag Obs 
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BAHRAIN -0.601 4.52E-05 0 0 9 
KUWAIT -0.324 2.26E-05 0 0 6 
OMAN -0.500 4.64E-05 0 0 9 
QATAR -0.272 4.47E-05 0 0 7 
SAUDIARA
BIA -0.779 2.58E-06 0 0 7 
UAE -0.527 0.000203 0 0 9 
YEMEN -0.552 1.15E-20 0 -1 4 
      
       
 
 
 
 
 
SUB1: 
 
 
Dependent Variable: LGDP   
Method: Panel Fully Modified Least Squares (FMOLS) 
Date: 05/03/16   Time: 18:34   
Sample (adjusted): 2004 2013   
Periods included: 10   
Cross-sections included: 5   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 48  
Panel method: Weighted estimation  
Cointegrating equation deterministics: C  
Long-run covariance estimates (Bartlett kernel, Newey-West fixed 
        bandwidth)   
Warning: one more more cross-sections have been dropped due to 
        estimation errors   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     LLABOR 1.140462 0.060621 18.81287 0.0000 
CPI -1.283247 0.107046 -11.98782 0.0000 
LFDI 0.263518 0.082428 3.196948 0.0029 
GOV 1.251074 0.105697 11.83640 0.0000 
CPI*LFDI -0.556294 0.057353 -9.699459 0.0000 
D1 -1.266276 0.125475 -10.09189 0.0000 
     
     R-squared -0.726707    Mean dependent var 7.953120 
Adjusted R-squared -1.254313    S.D. dependent var 0.730507 
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S.E. of regression 1.096810    Sum squared resid 43.30768 
Long-run variance 0.003141    
     
     
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: LGDP   
Method: Panel Fully Modified Least Squares (FMOLS) 
Date: 05/03/16   Time: 18:32   
Sample (adjusted): 2004 2013   
Periods included: 10   
Cross-sections included: 6   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 56  
Panel method: Weighted estimation  
Cointegrating equation deterministics: C  
Long-run covariance estimates (Bartlett kernel, Newey-West fixed 
        bandwidth)   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     LLABOR 1.084638 0.029986 36.17143 0.0000 
CPI -0.277516 0.073574 -3.771939 0.0005 
LFDI -0.456371 0.026342 -17.32473 0.0000 
GOV 0.204477 0.025971 7.873159 0.0000 
CPI*LFDI -0.176380 0.021589 -8.169987 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.248116    Mean dependent var 7.844902 
Adjusted R-squared 0.081031    S.D. dependent var 0.727080 
S.E. of regression 0.696999    Sum squared resid 21.86137 
Long-run variance 0.007450    
     
     
 
 
Dependent Variable: LGDP   
Method: Panel Fully Modified Least Squares (FMOLS) 
Date: 05/03/16   Time: 18:35   
Sample (adjusted): 2004 2013   
Periods included: 10   
Cross-sections included: 5   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 48  
Panel method: Weighted estimation  
Cointegrating equation deterministics: C  
Long-run covariance estimates (Bartlett kernel, Newey-West fixed 
        bandwidth)   
Warning: one more more cross-sections have been dropped due to 
        estimation errors   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     LLABOR 1.846187 0.063960 28.86476 0.0000 
CPI -1.227865 0.124887 -9.831788 0.0000 
LFDI -0.114780 0.039887 -2.877666 0.0066 
GOV 0.422206 0.036989 11.41433 0.0000 
D1 0.241022 0.057572 4.186485 0.0002 
     
     R-squared 0.613517    Mean dependent var 7.953120 
Adjusted R-squared 0.509063    S.D. dependent var 0.730507 
S.E. of regression 0.511844    Sum squared resid 9.693403 
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Long-run variance 0.003266    
     
     
 
SUB2: 
 
Dependent Variable: LGDP   
Method: Panel Fully Modified Least Squares (FMOLS) 
Date: 05/03/16   Time: 18:37   
Sample (adjusted): 2004 2013   
Periods included: 10   
Cross-sections included: 6   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 52  
Panel method: Weighted estimation  
Cointegrating equation deterministics: C  
Long-run covariance estimates (Bartlett kernel, Newey-West fixed 
        bandwidth)   
Warning: one more more cross-sections have been dropped due to 
        estimation errors   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     LLABOR -0.365750 0.040039 -9.134859 0.0000 
CPI 0.400715 0.136299 2.939976 0.0054 
GOV 0.121890 0.148324 0.821780 0.4161 
LFDI 0.106699 0.072192 1.477997 0.1472 
CPI*LFDI 0.303099 0.027219 11.13542 0.0000 
     
     R-squared -6.066744    Mean dependent var 10.03350 
Adjusted R-squared -8.010098    S.D. dependent var 0.508612 
S.E. of regression 1.526691    Sum squared resid 93.23145 
Long-run variance 0.001868    
     
     
 
 
Dependent Variable: LGDP   
Method: Panel Fully Modified Least Squares (FMOLS) 
Date: 05/03/16   Time: 18:37   
Sample (adjusted): 2004 2013   
Periods included: 10   
Cross-sections included: 6   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 52  
Panel method: Weighted estimation  
Cointegrating equation deterministics: C  
Long-run covariance estimates (Bartlett kernel, Newey-West fixed 
        bandwidth)   
Warning: one more more cross-sections have been dropped due to 
        estimation errors   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     LLABOR -0.156224 0.035546 -4.394968 0.0001 
CPI 0.358581 0.117827 3.043274 0.0041 
GOV -0.230213 0.142467 -1.615909 0.1138 
LFDI 0.068519 0.068263 1.003746 0.3214 
     
     R-squared 0.862902    Mean dependent var 10.03350 
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Adjusted R-squared 0.829464    S.D. dependent var 0.508612 
S.E. of regression 0.210037    Sum squared resid 1.808732 
Long-run variance 0.002892    
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